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I. INTRODUCTION
There is no question but that the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, signed into law by President George Bush on November
15, 1990 will have a tremendous impact on the future of the Amer-
ican coal industry. Title IV of these amendments represents a bold
step forward in the effort to control the precursors to acid rain,
particularly in terms of its approach to reducing emissions of sul-
fur dioxide. Rather than relying on more traditional regulatory
mechanisms - such as uniform emission standards or mandated
technological controls - the acid rain provisions of the 1990
amendments are built around the creation of a system of mar-
ketable emission allowances. While economic theory has long sug-
gested that the use of market-based regulatory mechanisms, such
as marketable allowances, represents an efficient approach to
achieving a predetermined environmental goal, we have had little
practical experience with such market-based mechanisms in the
United States, particularly at the federal level.
Undoubtedly, this lack of.experience with the use of marketable
emission allowances explains some of the anxiety and uncertainty
caused by the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
Other possible explanations for the anxiety include the complexity
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and length of the legislation, as well as the ambitious emission
reduction requirements that it establishes. It is my hope that I
might reduce at least some of the uncertainty that exists by: (1)
outlining how the acid rain provisions of the 1990 Amendments
are intended to work; and (2) explaining how I, working with a
coalition of Senators from the coal states of Appalachia and the
Midwest, attempted to amend and improve the bill as it moved
both through the Senate and conference. Finally, I wish briefly to
review some of the concerns I have with the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990; concerns which led me to vote against both the
final passage of the bill in the Senate on April 3, and the adoption
of the conference report on October 27.
II. THE INTENT OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENT OF 1990
The primary goal of the acid rain provisions of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, with respect to sulfur dioxide emissions,
is to reduce such emissions by ten million tons below 1980 levels.
Once achieved, this ten million ton reduction is to be maintained
by the establishment of a permanent cap on future utility emissions
of sulfur dioxide. The road from passage of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 to achievement of a true ten million ton
reduction in emissions is not, however, a straight one. As noted
above, the law is complex, filled with a number of special pro-
visions that often make it difficult to follow or understand.
Title IV of the law is structured in a way so that the goal of
a ten million ton reduction is to be achieved in two phases.' In
Phase I, only the largest emitters - those with a nameplate ca-
pacity of more than 100 megawatts (MWe) and a 1985 emissions
rate greater than 2.5 pounds per million British Thermal Units (lb/
1. It may provide for an easier understanding of the law, to think of the emissions reduction
program as actually being divided into three phases. The law itself sets forth only two phases: Phase
I, which begins January 1, 1995; and, Phase II, which begins January 1, 2000. The law, however,
also sets up a special reserve of allowances to be allocated to affected units over the first ten years
of Phase II. As a result, although Phase II commences in calendar year 2000, as does imposition of
a permanent cap on utility emissions, the goal of a ten-million-ton reduction in emissions is not
achieved until the year 2010. One may find it easier, therefore, to think of a third phase of the law's
acid rain control program as beginning on January 1, 2010, although no such phase is explicitly
mentioned in the law.
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mmBtu) - are defined as "affected sources," and are subject to
the emissions limitations specified in the law. In Phase II, virtually
every utility that burns fossil fuels, except very small units with
a nameplate capacity of twenty-five MWe or less, is subject to
some level of emissions limitation.
III. PHASE I OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
In Phase I, individual affected "units," which are a part of
an affected source, are awarded a specific number of allowances
annually, with each allowance essentially entitling its holder to
emit one ton of sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere. Although the
exact number of allowances issued in Phase 7I to each affected unit
is listed in Table A of section 404 of the Act, the number of
allowances so allocated is based on a formula equal to each unit's
"baseline" (its average annual fuel consumption in 1985-87, meas-
ured in millions of Btu's) multiplied -by a 2.5 lb/mmBtu emissions
rate, and divided by 2,000. While the Phase I allowance formula
is based on a 2.5 lb/mmBtu emission rate, it would be incorrect
to characterize affected Phase I units as being required to meet
a 2.5 lb/mmBtu emissions rate standard.
Allowances are transferable, both between affected units and
from a current year to any future year. As a result, to the extent
that some affected units elect to overcontrol, or exceed their emis-
sions reduction obligations, and then trade their excess allowances,
other affected units will be able to undercontrol, or reduce their
emissions less than would be required under a mandatory 2.5 lb/
mmBtu emission rate standard. An affected Phase I unit could,
in other words, continue to operate after January 1, 1995, at an
emissions rate greater than 2.5 lb/mmBtu and still comply with
the law, as long as the owner/operator of the unit is able to pur-
chase, from one or more other affected units, additional emission
allowances sufficient to cover its excess emissions. A marketable
allowance system thus allows each affected unit much greater flex-
ibility in developing its compliance strategy than would a more
traditional "command- and-control" approach. Assuming the ex-
istence of a robust market for allowances, this increased flexibility
creates the potential for significant cost savings in achieving the
1991]
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desired level of emissions reduction. In addition, allowance trading
is also likely to create an opportunity for affected utility units
with relatively large emission reduction obligations to realize some
degree of cost-sharing relief.
High-emitting utilities are likely to face lower marginal costs
of control than low-emitting utilities. As a result, there will be an
incentive for a high-emitting utility to generate excess emission
allowances through a strategy of overcontrol, so that it can then
sell its excess allowances to another utility with relatively high con-
trol costs. The price at which the excess allowance would be sold
would be somewhere between the marginal control costs of the
low- and the high-emitting utilities. The net result would be a re-
duction in costs for both utilities. The high-emitting utility would
use the proceeds from the sale to offset some portion of its overall
compliance costs, and, since the price it would receive for the
excess allowances would be greater than the cost of generating such
allowances, the amount of revenues gained from overcontrol would
exceed the incremental costs associated with overcontrol. In other
words, the high-emitting utility would realize a net reduction in
its compliance costs by generating and selling excess allowances.
At the same time, by going into the market and purchasing the
excess allowances of the high-emitting utility, the overall compli-
ance costs of the low-emitting utility would also be reduced, since
the cost of purchasing allowances would be less than the cost of
actually reducing emissions. The key here is that allowance trading
is not a zero-sum game. Both low- and high-emitting utilities can
potentially gain from the flexibility and freedom of choice asso-
ciated with a regulatory system built upon the use of marketable
allowances, and will do so assuming there is a robust and smooth-
functioning market for allowances. Whether or not such a market
is likely to develop is an issue that will be discussed later.
IV. BYRD-BOND AMENDMENT TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Another important aspect of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 is that not all affected Phase I units are required to meet
the Phase I compliance deadline of January 1, 1995. If an affected
unit elects to meet its Phase I emissions reduction obligation either
[Vol. 93
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by: (1) employing a technological system of continuous emissions
control achieving a 90% reduction in emissions (i.e., a "qualifying
Phase I technology") or (2) transferring its Phase I emissions re-
duction obligation to a unit employing a qualifying technology, it
may qualify, as an "eligible Phase I extension unit," for a two-
year extension or delay of the Phase I compliance deadline. During
the period of the delay, in 1995 and 1996, each extension unit
would be entitled to its regular allocation of emission allowance
provided in Table A of section 404 of the Act. In both 1995 and
1996, each extension unit would also be issued additional allow-
ances, from a special reserve of allowances available only for use
by eligible extension units, equal to the difference between the
number of allowances specified in Table A and the lesser of (1)
its average annual emissions in 1988 and 1989 or (2) its projected
emissions, absent any emission controls, in 1995 and 1996. Each
extension unit would, in essence, be exempt from the emission
reduction requirements of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
until January 1, 1997.
Beyond being granted a two-year delay in the Phase I com-
pliance deadline, any extension unit that actually installs a qual-
ifying technology, which, for all practical purposes, would be
limited to a flue gas desulfurization (FGD) unit, or scrubber, given
the 90% reduction requirement included in the definition of a qual-
ifying technology, would also be entitled to receive, in calendar
years 1997 through 1999, additional "bonus" allowances equal to
the difference between the unit's actual emissions in each of those
three years and its calculated emissions, at an emissions rate of
1.2 lb/mmBtu. (As with the extra allowances issued to an extension
unit during the period of the two-year extension, these additional
bonus allowances would also be drawn from the special reserve
mentioned above.)
Finally, and significantly, if an eligible extension unit elects to
begin scrubbing prior to January 1, 1997, that unit would not
forfeit its eligibility for the two-year delay. Emissions reductions
achieved by an extension unit in 1995 or 1996 would be early re-
ductions. By scrubbing before the 1997 compliance deadline ap-
plicable to eligible extension units, an extension unit would, in
1991]
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effect, be converting the benefits of the two-year extension into
"credits for early reduction." Rather than being forced to use the
additional allowances provided during the extension period to cover
the emissions of the extension unit, scrubbing early would enable
the owner/operator of the extension unit to use those allowances:
(1) to offset the emissions reduction obligations of other affected
Phase I (non-extension) units; (2) to save the allowances for use
in Phase II; or (3) to sell the allowances to another utility or other
buyer.
All of the provisions regarding eligible Phase I extension units
are intended to encourage utilities with affected Phase I units to
incorporate the use of scrubbers in their overall compliance strat-
egies, and thus help reduce, at least during Phase I, the potentially
disruptive impact of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 on
existing coal markets. From the outset of the debate over new clean
air legislation, it was clear that any new effort to control sulfur
dioxide emissions could have a devastating impact on the high-sulfur
coal regions of northern Appalachia and the Midwest.
The scrubber incentives outlined above, taken from a proposal
that eventually became known as the Byrd-Bond Amendment, were
developed over a period of several months by a coalition of coal-
state Senators, including Senator Christopher S. Bond of Missouri
and myself, and are designed to help mitigate the impact of new
sulfur dioxide controls on the high-sulfur mining communities in
our states. While it is not yet possible to know precisely what impact
the 1990 Amendments will have on the coal industry, it is my belief
that the scrubber incentives incorporated into the law will have a
significant positive effect in terms of minimizing the adverse impact
of the Phase I emission reduction requirements on high-sulfur coal.
To understand how these Phase I scrubber incentives might re-
duce the impact of the law on the high-sulfur coal industry, consider
the following hypothetical. Assume that the U.S. Power Company
(US Power) has the following affected Phase I units:
[Vol. 93
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Affected Phase I Units of US Power
Projected
Annual
Emissions,
1995/1996*
160,000
Phase I
Allowances
67,000
Emission
Reduction
Obligation
93,000
Green Tree
1
2
3
Red Spruce
120,000
80,000
50,000
1 36,000
2 36,000
Bass Lake
1 40,000
2 32,000
* Uncontrolled, and assumed
annual emissions in 1988 and
60,000
40,000
25,000
20,000
20,000
25,000
20,000
to be equal
1989.
60,000
40,000
25,000
16,000
16,000
15,000
12,000
to or less than average
Further assume that US Power intends to reduce its emissions
at Big Bear 1 through use of a "qualifying Phase I technology,"
thereby reducing its emissions at the unit to a level well below that
allowed in Phase I. By developing a compliance plan based upon
the installation of a scrubber at Big Bear 1, US Power would be
eligible to receive a two-year extension of the Phase I compliance
deadline at the unit. In addition, once the scrubber was made op-
erational, US Power would be issued allowances, from Table A
above, in excess of the number necessary to cover the unit's actual
post-compliance emissions. Finally, by reducing the emissions rate
at Big Bear 1 to a level less than 1.2 lb/mmBtu through the use of
a qualifying technology, US Power would also be eligible to receive
"bonus" allowances in calendar years 1997 through 1999.
The following two scenarios show how US Power might adjust
its compliance strategy and use the excess allowances generated at
Big Bear 1 to offset or cover the emissions reduction obligations of
other Phase I units within its system.
Big Bear
1991]
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Scenario 1: Assume US Power, electing to take full advantage
of the two-year delay, begins operation of its "qualifying
Phase I technology" at -Big Bear 1 on January 1, 1997.
In both 1995 and 1996, as an "eligible Phase I extension unit,"
Big Bear 1 would be provided with additional emission allowances
sufficient to allow the unit to operate without any new emission
controls. Beginning in 1997, with its scrubber operational, Big Bear
1 would emit only sixteen tons of sulfur dioxide annually, a level
51,000 tons below its allowable Phase I emissions. In addition, Big
Bear 1 would also generate 16,000 "bonus" allowances each year
between 1997 and 1999, as a result of its emissions rate falling to
a level below 1.2 lb/mmBtu. Altogether, Big Bear 1 would generate
67,000 excess allowances a year between 1997 and 1999. It would
thus generate a supply of excess allowances sufficient to cover the
combined Phase I emission reduction obligations of Green Tree 2,
Bass Lake 1, and Bass Lake 2. As a result, US Power would be
able to transfer the emission reduction obligations of all three units
to Big Bear 1, thereby also qualifying Green Tree 2, Bass Lake 1,
and Bass Lake 2 for treatment as "eligible Phase I extension units."
Overall, US Power's Phase I compliance strategy would entail:
" scrubbing Big Bear 1 in 1997;
* fuel-switching Green Tree 1, Green Tree 3, Red Spruce
1, and Red Spruce 2 in 1995; and
" taking no action to reduce emissions at Green Tree 2, Bass
Lake 1, or Bass Lake 2.
Scenario 2: Assume US Power, electing to earn credit for making
early reductions, begins operation of its "qualifying Phase I tech-
nology" at Big Bear 1 on January 1, 1995.
As under scenario 1, between 1997 and 1999, scrubbing Big Bear
1 would generate a sufficient number of excess allowances to cover
the combined emissions reduction obligations of Green Tree 2, Bass
Lake 1, and Bass Lake 2, thereby allowing US Power to transfer
the emission reduction obligations of those units to Big Bear 1. As
a result, as under the previous scenario, Big Bear 1 and the three
"transfer" units would qualify for treatment as "eligible Phase I
[Vol. 93
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extension units," and scrubbing Big Bear 1 would allow US Power
to avoid having to reduce emissions at Green Tree 2, Bass Lake 1,
or Bass Lake 2 during Phase I.
In addition, by scrubbing Big Bear 1 early, US Power would
also be able to generate an additional 144,000 excess allowances in
both 1995 and 1996. The decision to scrub Big Bear 1 early would
not invalidate its eligibility for a two-year extension of the Phase
I compliance deadline. While emissions at Big Bear 1, with a scrub-
ber in operation, would be reduced to only 16,000 tons in both 1995
and 1996, the unit would be awarded 160,000 allowances in each
of those years: 67,000 from the Table A allocation of allowances,
and an additional 93,000 from the special Phase I allowance reserve
set aside for eligible extension units. As a result, Big Bear 1 would
generate a total of 288,000 additional excess allowances during the
1995-1996 period. Spread over five years, these additional allowances
could be used to offset an additional 58,000 tons of emission re-
duction obligations during Phase I. US Power could thus cover the
combined Phase I emission reduction obligations of Green Tree 3,
Red Spruce 1, and Red Spruce 2 with the excess allowances generated
by scrubbing Big Bear 1 early.
Overall, US Power's Phase I compliance strategy would include:
" Scrubbing Big Bear 1 in 1995;
" fuel-switching Green Tree 1 in 1995; and
• taking no action to reduce emissions at Green Tree 2,
Green Tree 3, Red Spruce 1, Red Spruce 2, Bass Lake 1,
or Bass Lake 2.
If US Power elected not to scrub Big Bear 1, it would be required
either to fuel-switch all eight of its affected Phase I units beginning
in 1995, or to go into the market and purchase allowances from
another utility to cover the excess emissions for any unit at which
it does not fuel-switch. Clearly, the high- sulfur coal industry would
suffer a significant loss of market share if utilities, such as US Power
in the above hypothetical, chose not to scrub any affected Phase I
units. Yet, as shown in the above hypothetical, the scrubber incen-
tives incorporated in the Clean Air Act Amendments will enable a
utility to maintain existing high-sulfur coal contracts at a larger num-
1991]
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ber of affected units than those at which an FGD unit will be in-
stalled. By scrubbing Big Bear 1 in 1997, as in scenario 1, US Power
would be able to cover the emission reduction obligations of three
other affected units, thereby avoiding the need to fuel-switch those
units. In scenario 2, scrubbing Big Bear 1 in 1995 would enable US
Power to cover the emission reduction obligations of six other af-
fected units, leaving it with only one unit at which it would be forced
to fuel-switch.
It is important to note that, although the costs associated with
the installation and operation of an FGD unit are, in almost all
cases, higher than the costs involved in switching to a lower sulfur
coal, the scrubber incentives built into the law will not increase the
overall costs of compliance. As noted previously, affected utilities
will be free to develop their own individual compliance strategies,
and it can be generally assumed that they will adopt compliance
strategies that minimize their compliance costs. As a result, a utility
will elect to scrub an affected Phase I unit only if doing so is
estimated to be cost-effective. Rather than mandating the use of
scrubbers, the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act encourage
the use of technological emission controls by increasing the benefits
associated with the use of such technological controls. It is, in fact,
possible that the scrubber incentives included in the Act could re-
duce the overall costs of compliance.
The only social cost associated with these scrubber incentives
is likely to be environmental, not economic. To the extent that
some affected Phase I units are allowed to delay compliance with
the Phase I emission reduction requirements of the law, there will
also be a delay in achieving some amount of sulfur dioxide emission
reductions. I would suggest, however, that the potential cost to the
environment is negligible. Without any Phase I scrubber incentives,
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 could be expected to achieve
a cumulative reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions of 100 million
tons or more by the year 2010. The magnitude of any emissions
reductions foregone as a result of the provisions relating to eligible
extension units is limited to the size of the special reserve of al-
lowances created for use by such units. In view of the fact that
this reserve will contain no more than 3.5 million allowances, or
[Vol. 93
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about three percent of the cumulative emissions reductions expected
over the next 20 years, I would suggest that the potential envi-
ronmental cost of the emissions reductions foregone is acceptable.
Taking into account the potentially devastating job losses and ec-
onomic dislocation that will be avoided in the high-sulfur mining
regions of northern Appalachia and the Midwest, I would go so
far as to suggest that the technology incentives included in the 1990
amendments to the Clean Air Act could produce a net social wel-
fare gain.
V. PHASE II OF THE CLEAN AiR ACT
In Phase II, which commences on January 1, 2000, the universe
of affected units is substantially broader, as almost every utility
unit with a nameplate capacity greater than twenty-five MWe is
subject to some level of emissions limitation. Unlike in Phase I,
however, no single formula is used to determine the number of
allowances to which every affected Phase II unit is entitled. Instead,
the Phase II allowance formulas vary according to the 1985 emis-
sion rates of the affected units, as well as their size or nameplate
capacity. (Except for some very narrowly drawn exceptions, each
of the Phase II allowance formulas is based on emission rates of
1.2 lb/mmBtu or less.) Additionally, as noted earlier, a special
reserve of allowances is created in Phase II for the purpose of
providing affected units with additional allowances through the year
2009. The allocation formulas for these reserve allowances are also
based on the 1985 emission rates and nameplate capacity figures
of the affected units. Finally, there are a number of targeted pro-
visions designed to provide additional allowances to specific utility
units or systems deemed to be worthy of special relief.
In total, there are more than thirty different provisions relating
to Phase II allowance allocations. While providing a description
here of each would be cumbersome, and possibly overwhelming,
it would be accurate to say that, in general, low-emitting and smaller
units are treated more favorably under the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990 than are larger units with high 1985 emission rates.
As in Phase I, not all affected Phase II units are required to meet
the Phase II compliance deadline of January 1, 2000. Both to en-
1991]
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courage and even to allow the use of emerging clean coal tech-
nologies in phase II, any affected unit that elects to "repower"
its existing coal-fired boiler with an approved clean coal technology
may delay compliance with the emission reduction requirements of
the Act until December 31, 2003. With respect to the specific tech-
nologies that would allow an affected unit to qualify for the ex-
tension, a list of approved technologies is included in the law. In
addition, the list may be expanded, if the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in consultation with the
Secretary of the Department of Energy, determines that additional
technologies satisfy a rigorous set of standards relating to multiple
emissions reductions, improved boiler or generation efficiency, and
increased waste reduction.
It is highly unlikely that the clean coal technologies currently
under development will be commercially available by January 1,
2000. Therefore, absent an adequate extension of the Phase II com-
pliance deadline, utilities would be effectively precluded from using
advanced clean coal technologies as part of their compliance strat-
egies. Given the role that these technologies could have in helping
to achieve future environmental and energy goals, the Phase II
deadline extension for affected units that elect to employ a clean
coal technology is an important part of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990.
VI. CONCERNS ABOUT THE CLEAN AiR ACT
Having provided an outline of how the acid rain provisions of
the law are intended to work, let me now briefly turn to some con-
cerns I have with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. As noted
earlier, realization of the cost-minimizing benefits of a regulatory
system built upon the use of marketable allowances is dependent on
the development of an active and smooth-functioning market for
those allowances. If such a market fails to develop, and allowance
trading fails to occur, the potential cost-saving benefits of a market-
based regulatory approach are not likely to be achieved.
In my view, it is not clear how well market-based incentives,
such as tradeable allowances, will work in a heavily regulated in-
dustry, such as the electric utility industry. I am concerned that,
[Vol. 93
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with respect to the acid rain provisions of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990, reality may very well diverge from theory, and the
cost-saving and cost-sharing potential of this bold new regulatory
approach may never be realized. Few, if any, industries are as heav-
ily regulated as the electric utility industry. As a result of the reg-
ulated environment in which they operate, electric utilities are not
necessarily driven by the same profit-maximizing motives that are
assumed to motivate most free-market enterprises, or at least not
driven to the same degree by such motives. Certainly, few would
take exception to an assertion that utilities are likely to be more risk
averse than are businesses operating in highly competitive and un-
regulated markets. As a result, it is not clear that a robust market
for emission allowances will necessarily develop.
As already noted, cost-minimization assumes that utilities with
relatively low marginal costs of control will overcontrol and thus
generate excess emission allowances which will be sold to utilities
with relatively high marginal control costs. Yet, a utility with low
marginal control costs may be unwilling to bear the risk of having
to incur the extra costs necessary to generate excess allowances on
the chance that it will, at some point in time, be able to recover
those additional costs, either from being able to sell the allowances
to another utility or from being allowed to pass on the costs to its
customers in the form of higher electric rates. If the utility is un-
willing to bear this risk, it would simply elect not to overcontrol.
With respect to the compliance strategies of utilities affected by
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, it is not unreasonable to
think that utilities with affected Phase I units may assume that the
risks associated with overcontrol are excessively high. It is likely that
such utilities will be attempting to finalize their Phase I compliance
strategies before a clear market price for allowances will have had
time to be established. Without a clear signal as to what the market
price for allowances will be, utilities with presumably relatively low
marginal control costs may be hesitant to adopt a strategy incor-
porating some degree of overcontrol. Because of the uncertainty of
the market price for allowances, and the risk associated with that
uncertainty, it is possible that allowance trading may, in effect, be
restricted in Phase I to trades between affected units within the same
1991]
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utility system. Although intra utility trading would almost certainly
produce some reduction in overall costs, it is likely that the cost-
savings generated would be less than the potential savings associated
with unrestricted inter utility trading. (Even with respect to intra
utility trading, there are reasons to expect that trading in this arena
may also be impeded, particularly if the potential trades involve
utility units in different states. As a result, even the potential cost-
savings to be gained from intra-utility trading may not be fully re-
alized.)
The problem associated with the lack of a clear market price for
allowances is but one potential problem associated with the market-
based regulatory system created under the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990. There are numerous other potential problems as well.
For example, even if a utility were willing to bear the risk discussed
above, and elected to overcontrol in Phase I and generate excess
allowances, there is some questions as to whether the utility would
be free to sell any excess allowances it might so generate. Because
the law places a permanent cap on utility emissions after the year
2000, any future growth in emissions will have to be offset by re-
ductions in emissions at existing sources in excess of the specific
emission reduction obligations for such sources already set forth in
the law. In other words, to the extent that economic growth stim-
ulates the demand for electricity, and thereby increases emissions,
allowances could become a key to future economic growth. In light
of this fact, a state public service commission (PSC) may attempt
to prohibit its utilities from selling or trading away any excess al-
lowances they might generate through overcontrol. If this were to
occur, the result would, again, be a breakdown in the allowance
trading system, and the loss of part, if not all, of the potential cost-
savings associated with allowance trading.
Whether or not all of the potential problems that could plague
the allowance trading system will actually come to pass is not clear.
Provisions attempting to deal with a number of these problems are
included in the law. For example, beginning in 1993, the EPA is
charged with conducting an annual auction of emission allowances
withheld from affected units. Although the number of allowances
to be auctioned will be relatively small, the purpose of the auctions
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is to encourage the early establishment of a market price for al-
lowances. Yet, establishing a market price for allowances in 1993
may not be early enough to address the problem discussed above.
All affected Phase I units are required under the law to submit their
Phase I compliance plans no later than February 15, 1993. Fur-
thermore, as noted earlier, the reserve of allowances set aside for
use by eligible Phase I extension units is limited to 3.5 million al-
lowances or less. Allowances in this reserve are to be drawn down
on a first-come, first-serve basis. Therefore, any affected Phase I
unit wishing to qualify for the extension will be under great pressure
to finalize and submit its compliance plans far in advance of the
February 15, 1993 deadline. Conducting an allowance auction in
1993, while perhaps useful for other purposes, is unlikely to elim-
inate or reduce, in a timely fashion, the uncertainty about the market
value of allowances that could retard or prevent the development
of a robust trading system.
Although the concerns I have about the potential shortcomings
of the allowance trading system established under the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 are very serious, my concerns extend beyond
the allowance trading provisions of the law. Efficiency is not the
only standard by which a system of environmental regulations should
be judged. An equally important issue is that of equity, and, in this
regard, I question whether the costs of the acid rain control pro-
visions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 will be distributed
in an equitable and fair manner. It is my contention that the emis-
sion reduction requirements of the law unfairly require that a dis-
proportionate share of the overall ten million ton reduction in
emissions be achieved by the utility sector and, in particular, by
utilities in those states that have traditionally relied most on the use
of high-sulfur coal.
According to the EPA, 25.7 million tons of sulfur dioxide were
emitted into the air in the United States in 1980, with the utility
sector accounting for approximately 17.5 million tons, or 68%, and
the non-utility sector accounting for 8.2 million tons, or 32%. By
the year 2010, under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, util-
ities will be required to reduce their annual emissions of sulfur di-
oxide by 8.5 million tons below 1980 levels and approximately 7.0
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million tons below 1985 levels. Over the same period, non-utility
sources will be required to make no new reductions in emissions
below 1985 levels. The reason for this apparent disparity is that non-
utility sources are estimated to have reduced their emissions by 1.0
to 1.5 million tons between 1980 and 1985. Further, non-utility sul-
fur dioxide emissions are projected to remain at or below their 1985
levels indefinitely. As a result, the non-utility sector is essentially
exempt from any further emission reduction requirements.
Even assuming that non-utility sources have already reduced
emissions by 1.5 million tons below 1980 levels, to exempt the non-
utility sector from any further emission reductions requires that the
utility sector must assume responsibility for a disproportionate share
of the overall ten million ton reduction goal. Although responsible
for only 68% of total sulfur dioxide emissions in 1980, utilities will
be required to make 85% of the emission reductions necessary to
achieve the ten million ton goal. At the same time, non-utility sources
escape from any further reduction requirements after making only
15% of the reductions necessary, even though such sources ac-
counted for 32% of all 1980 emissions.
Setting aside the issue of the emission reduction requirements of
the non-utility sector, a similar disproportionality exists within the
utility sector itself. In 1980, seven states - Illinois, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia - ac-
counted for 54% of all sulfur dioxide emissions nationwide. Yet,
under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, these seven states
will account for 72% of the total emission reductions to be achieved
in the year 2010. Upon full implementation, the emission reduction
requirements of the law will result in a 49% reduction in nationwide
emissions in the year 2010. Although fairness may not necessitate
an exactly proportional distribution of the overall emissions reduc-
tion burden, I would suggest that the actual distribution, as shown
in the table below, is so far from proportional that it raises serious
equity concerns. For example, while Missouri and Indiana will be
required to reduce emissions by 7507o and 69% respectively, utility
emissions in Arkansas and Louisiana will be allowed to increase by
207% and 361% respectively.
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Utility Sulfur Dioxide Emissions, 1980 vs. 2010
Missouri
Indiana
Tennessee
Ohio
California
Illinois
Kentucky
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
West Virgini
ME/NH/VT
Iowa
U.S. Total
Mississippi
New York
Alabama
NC/SC
Florida
Georgia
WA/OR
Minnesota
Wyoming
Michigan
New Jersey
MD/DE/DC
New Mexico
Virginia
KS/NE
MA/CT/RI
Montana
Colorado
ND/SD
Utah
Arizona
Actual
Emission
(1980)
1,1
1,5
9
2,1
1,1
9
1,4
4
a 9
2
(in thousands of to
Allowable
s Emissions
(2010)
71 288
:75 489
'59 299
79 689
71 25
15 408
'92 379
.72 582
.62 184
'68 440
98 47
32 115
17,483
128
485
577
664
733
760
74
164
123
564
105
281
98
165
212
309
25
71
113
24
85
8,907
67
278
338
400
451
468
46
107
81
380
72
196
70
132
170
266
30
93
150
37
140
ns)
Change in
(tons)
-883
-1,086
-660
-1,490
-46
-707
-613
-890
-278
-528
-51
-117
-8,576
-61
-207
-239
-264
-282
-292
-28
-57
-42
-184
-33
-85
-28
-33
-42
-43
5
22
37
13
55
Emissions
(percent)
-75.4%
-69.0%
-68.8%
-68.4%
-64.8%
-63.4%
-61.8070
-60.5%
-60.2%
-54.5%
-52.0%
-50.4%
-49.1/o
-47.7%
-42.7%
-41.4%
-39.8%
-38.5%
-38.4%
-37.8%
-34.8%
-34.1%0o
-32.6%
-31.4%
-30.2%
-28.6%
-20.0%
-19.8%
-13.9o
20.0%
31.0%
32.7%
54.2%1o
64.7%
1991]
17
Byrd: The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: An Innovative, but Uncertai
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Nevada 41 75 34 82.9%
Texas 299 624 325 108.7%
Oklahoma 39 102 63 161.5%
Arkansas 27 83 56 .4%
Louisiana 23 106 83 360.9%
source: ICF Resources, Incorporated
Finally, although the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 contain
incentives designed to encourage the utilization of clean coal tech-
nologies by affected Phase II units, I question whether the incentives
included are adequate to allow utilities to make use of the most
advanced coal technologies currently under development. These ad-
vanced technologies promise to provide far greater environmental
benefits than do any technologies available today. With respect to
our long-term environmental and energy concerns, the continued
development and future deployment of advanced clean coal tech-
nologies are perhaps our brightest hopes for the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
The realities of American energy use are clear. Reality number
one is that coal is, by far, our most plentiful domestic energy re-
source. Reality number two is that coal currently accounts for more
than 5000 of our domestic electricity production. Reality number
three is that, even with significant increases in conservation, as well
as increased exploitation and development of other domestic energy
resources, coal will continue to be responsible for over half of our
electric power generation well into the future.
As a result, it is important that the continued development of
new clean coal technologies be encouraged, not impeded. Such tech-
nologies are our best hope, not only for addressing concerns about
acid rain, but also about global warming as well. The concern that
I have with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 is that, just as
most clean coal technologies currently under development are un-
likely to be ready for commercial application by the beginning of
Phase II, many of the most advanced technologies are not likely to
be commercially viable even by December 31, 2003. In an effort to
reduce sulfur dioxide emissions as quickly as possible, the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990 may, therefore, effectively preclude the
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use of those clean coal technologies that promise to respond not
only to current, but also to future, possibly even more serious, en-
vironmental concerns and energy needs. As noted at the outset, the
acid rain control provisions of the Clean Air Amendments of 1990
represent a bold new step in the effort to improve the quality of
our environment. The goals set forth by the law are ambitious, and
the regulatory structure it establishes is innovative, as well as com-
plicated. A full and complete understanding of the law requires a
careful reading of its many provisions. Some questions and uncer-
tainties about the law are likely to be resolved as the EPA proceeds
with the unprecedented number of rulemakings that it is now charged
with making in a relatively short period of time. Other questions
will only be answered as the various provisions of the law actually
take effect. For the coal industry, the future may appear cloudy,
but the task ahead is clear: to make the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 work in a way that will improve the quality of our air,
while still supplying the United States with the basic energy upon
which its economic future continues to depend.
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